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Abstract
This paper proposes a new approach to the forensic investigation of Internet history artefacts by aggregating the
history from a recovered device into sessions and comparing those sessions to other sessions to determine whether they
are one-time events or form a repetitive or habitual pattern. We describe two approaches for performing the session
aggregation: fixed-length sessions and variable-length sessions. We also describe an approach for identifying repetitive
pattern of life behaviour and show how such patterns can be extracted and represented as binary strings. Using the
Jaccard similarity coefficient, a session-to-session comparison can be performed and the sessions can be analysed to
determine to what extent a particular session is similar to any other session in the Internet history, and thus is highly
likely to correspond to the same user. Experiments have been conducted using two sets of test data, where multiple
users have access to the same computer. By identifying patterns of Internet usage that are unique to each user, our
approach exhibits a high success rate in attributing particular sessions of the Internet history to the correct user. This
can provide considerable help to a forensic investigator trying to establish which user was using the computer when a
web-related crime was committed.
Keywords: Digital Forensics, World Wide Web, Session-to-Session Analysis, Context Analysis, Pattern of Life,
Internet History Analysis
1. Introduction
During the course of a digital forensics examination,
the investigator has a variety of locations and artefacts
to search through to find the clues to show if a device
was used, misused or contains the evidence required for
the purpose of the investigation. In addition to the doc-
uments, pictures, media files etc. which could be the im-
mediate target of the investigation, devices such as com-
puters, laptops, tablets, smart phones etc., routinely have
Internet connectivity, which can often also provide a trea-
sure trove of investigative clues to how the device was used.
The Internet history is an ordered list of artefacts that
contain a date, time and Universal Resource Locator (URL)
address of websites or resources that were accessed. The
history artefacts show the experienced investigator the types
of websites that were accessed and the times of day that
the users were active; they provide information about the
email and social media contacts that a user has; they can
show files, movies and pictures that have been downloaded.
The Internet history is where the investigator gets to see
the terms submitted to search engines, the poor spelling
and the languages that the users speak.
Analysis of Internet history artefacts is however time
consuming and to-date an ad hoc process. The artefacts
may be few in number due to the small size of the storage
medium, incomplete due to normal overwriting actions or
‘private browsing’ anti-forensics or even be quite extensive.
Each of these challenges do not detract from the impor-
tance of the investigative clues contained within the Inter-
net history artefacts. However, they do dictate whether
the Internet artefacts are only usable by the investigator
as clues to get a sense of how the device was used, or can be
presented as useful evidence in their own right at a court
or tribunal.
Above all, the Internet history artefacts show a user,
an actual person, interacting with the device. Such in-
teraction, shows the mental component of an action, the
mens rea, of the person at the keyboard. Brenner et al.
[2] highlight the R v Schofield case from the United King-
dom, where the prosecution was forced to dismiss charges
for possession of unlawful pictures because Trojan Horse
software was located on the defendant’s computer and ul-
timately the analysis had not established responsibility for
the creation of the unlawful pictures resting with the de-
fendant, or indeed any actual person.
For the forensic investigator it is difficult to show the
intent of the user of the system without placing the arte-
facts into contextual ordering. In the above case, the
unlawful pictures were considered in isolation and conse-
quently the intent of a user had not been distinguished
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from that of the activity of a Trojan Horse program. How-
ever, if for example in that case there were other artefacts
showing search terms submitted to a web browser before
the pictures were downloaded or link files after the down-
load that showed the access of the pictures, then despite
the fact that the Internet history and the link files were
different artefacts to the pictures, we would see a time-
line of artefacts that an analyst could contextually or-
der. If downloaded pictures on Schofield’s system were
always preceded by search artefacts and followed by link
files showing access this would also form a pattern, and if
the pattern could be observed, occurring over a variety of
times, then the existence of repetitive behaviour could be
established.
1.1. One-Time and Repetitive Patterns
We propose in this paper that activity on a comput-
ing device, and specifically within the Internet history for
such a device, can be classified as either one-time events
or repetitive events:
• A One-time event could be a single event such as
the moment malware was executed, or a short series
of events that are never repeated such as someone
searching the Internet for the phrase “how to make
a bomb” then proceeding to view a number of web-
sites that are relevant to the search term, but no
subsequent search or similar web page access is lo-
cated within the Internet history.
• Repetitive events show habitual patterns. There-
fore, to be considered a repetitive event, an event
must occur and re-occur at least at one other point.
Repetitive events are temporally ordered sequences
or clusters of activity within a temporal proximity
to each other. Sequential patterns are such that A,
B and C occur, in that order, within a timeframe.
Temporal Clusters are where A, B and C may oc-
cur in any order, combination or repetition within a
timeframe. For example, ACBAB.
Certain crimes or investigative goals lend themselves
to the identification and analysis of repetitive or habitual
behaviours, such as the accessing of indecent material or
‘grooming’ types of offences. Wherever there is a concern
about who was the operator of a device at a particular
point in time, even if that particular point in time is a
one-time activity, such as the sending of an inappropriate
email, if the one-time event is in close temporal proximity
to a repetitive pattern then an investigator may be able
to demonstrate the likeliness that the user at the time of
interest is the same user at a number of other times, which
can refute the “it wasn’t me” defence, as there is certainly
the appearance of a regular user of the device operating it
at that time.
Within this paper we discuss related work to the anal-
ysis of Internet history artefacts and the profiling of digi-
tal devices. We describe our approach of aggregating the
Internet artefacts into groups and then show how these
can be broken into components which allow the aggregate
groups to be compared to each other to see if there is
overlap in the membership. The experimental section of
this paper describes two different problems: finding the
most effective time value for the aggregation into sessions
and testing the effectiveness of the session-to-session com-
parison. As this paper reports on an ongoing research
project, our evaluation and conclusions review the encour-
aging results from the experiments and highlight possible
techniques to improve the performance of our approach.
2. Related work
One of the first attempts for a tool for forensic timeline
analysis was Zeitline, introduced by Buchholz and Falk in
2005 [3]. Its purpose was to reconstruct artefacts and en-
able an investigator to create complex events, using search-
ing and filtering to populate and analyse timelines. Dif-
ferent applications and different operating systems leave
behind footprints of their activity. The approach by Khan
and Wakeman [16] is to determine the footprint of appli-
cations on a system based upon the typical artefacts that
are created in normal usage. These features are then used
to train a neural network which could be used during a
forensic examination to attempt to reconstruct a timeline
of events concerning when applications were used.
In 2009, the Cyber Forensic TimeLab (CFTL) tool was
developed by Olsson and Boldt in [21]. CFTL can parse
a hard drive for known predefined artefacts to produce a
histogram timeline. It does not automatically analyse the
artefacts, but requires the analyst to make a visual corre-
lation of different timelines overlaid to display clusters.
Another tool for forensic investigations, log2timeline,
was reported in [8]. this tool creates a super-timeline by
placing all the information into a monolithic list which can
then be processed. This approach was endorsed by Car-
bone and Bean in the review of timeline creation utilities,
but in their view too many irrelevant files are included
[4]. Hargreaves and Patterson have developed a tool to
reconstruct high-level events from low-level activity using
temporal proximity pattern matching [11].
The cause and effect nature of event reconstruction has
been studied, recently James and Gladyshev [15] have de-
fined action instances, a state transition model where an
action produces a trace. If traces can be identified, then ac-
tions can be implied because of the causal nature of certain
state transitions on computer systems. In 2014, Zeitline
was brought back to the forefront and enhanced with new
features added by Inglot and Liu [12]. Chabot et al. [5]
use knowledge management, semantic web and data min-
ing to build a theoretical model, which they have called
SADFC (Semantic Analysis of Digital Forensic Cases) .
They propose that once implemented their tool will anal-
yse the events and then build and analyse a graphical rep-
resentation of the timeline. Khatik and Choudhary have
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developed a timeline visualization tool [17], which inte-
grates log files from web servers, searches for an activity
of interest and uses this to reconstruct the time line and
finally generates a report which can be used in court.
The above timeline analysis tools have provided real
benefits to forensic investigators. However, they are lim-
ited to the identification and presentation of known pat-
terns of events. Interpretation of events and the identi-
fication of unknown events can be seen in Marrington’s
computer profiling [19], as well as the statistical cluster-
ing on file systems proposed by Sven et al. [24]. Their
approach presupposes no prior knowledge of the system
and aims to identify what applications and files are closely
associated in time. Gresty et al. [7] used Principal Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA) to simplify Internet history timelines
from a large number of possible components, to a smaller
number that was more accessible for a human investigator
to review.
Outside of the area of traditional digital forensics in-
vestigations, there is interesting research into event recon-
struction, management and display. Kiernan and Terzi
[18] asserted that large event sequences must be reduced
and simplified to view, whilst at the same time giving a
global view of the activity to allow suspicious activity to be
detected. Examples of this problem domain would be re-
source management, database optimisation. The authors
propose techniques for the analysis of large-size audit logs
which need to be digested and displayed to an investi-
gator. Eagle and Pentland [6] assert that a person has
structures, routines and patterns of behaviour, which when
temporally, spatially and even socially contextualised can
be easily identified. The authors term these underlying
principal component-like behaviours as eigenbehaviours.
Ye et al. [26] propose a notation called life pattern nor-
mal form (LP-normal form) and a life pattern framework
to determine and mine location-based data about individ-
uals and their mobile computing habits. The authors of
this paper propose that the patterns refer to significant
places in an individuals daily life, but these must be ex-
tracted from raw GPS data, using “stay point” detection
and clustering. Schaefer et al. [23] describes event se-
quences and makes some notable distinctions between the
time-synchronous events, and between aggregate events.
The authors present different ways to visualise clusters of
events, gaps and indeed show representations which are
not timelines, but only event information. The approach
by Al Awawdeh et al. [1] is a real-time agent for recording
data as it happens rather than post-mortem style foren-
sics. The authors discuss the problem of verbosity, which
is the issue that unimportant details can be over-reported
in logs and salient details are not given adequate promi-
nence even though they are reported.
Hamid et al. [9] describe events as the interaction be-
tween “animate and inanimate objects” and highlight that
the area of activity discovery is for the identification of rep-
etitious patterns within sequences of data. The authors
show that sequences of behaviour can show classes of ac-
tivity, such as the sensors within a home showing someone
moving from the kitchen to the stairway etc. Minnen et
al. [20] describes motifs as sub-sequences within a longer
sequence of data that have high similarity but notes that
the problem with motif discovery is that the length, shape,
size and scale of them are not known in advance.
Research on timeline analysis in digital forensics has
traditionally focused on the identification of known se-
quences of events or the discovery of new ones. However,
by looking at sequences of events in isolation one can miss
clusters of behaviour that can provide useful information
for a user. This is particularly true for a user’s Inter-
net history, which often exhibits habitual behaviour but
not precise motif-type sequences. In the next sections, we
present a method for aggregating whole sequences of time-
line artefacts into sessions and performing session-session
comparisons of clusters of simplified data. We demonstrate
the usefulness of this approach for situations where mul-
tiple users share the same computer environment and we
evaluate its performance for different configurations.
3. Approach
3.1. Temporal Aggregation for sessions
Schaefer et al. [23] outlined two useful methods of
analysing temporal data, the sequence approach and the
aggregate approach:
• Temporal sequence comparison. Patterns are iden-
tified within an ordered, typically long, sequence of
data.
• Aggregate-against-aggregate comparison. A collec-
tion of grouped artefacts are compared against an-
other collection of grouped artefacts.
For the analysis of Internet history timelines, or for any
meta-data context analysis within digital forensic investi-
gations, we propose an approach where ‘session’ temporal
aggregates are compared against other ‘sessions’ to iden-
tify to what extent any of the sessions contain matching
members or components. Once sessions have been com-
pared and the like-for-like sessions have been grouped to-
gether, then the process of intra-session sequence analysis
can be performed to identify whether specific patterns of
components appear. This session-to-session grouping itself
provides significant macro-level contextual analysis about
the use of a device at any time, and temporal sequen-
tial analysis after this analysis, substantially reducing the
quantities of sequential data to be processed.
The selection of the session temporal aggregates is there-
fore fundamental. We identify two approaches to selecting
sessions:
• Fixed length sessions. Fixed periods of time are se-
lected in advance, for example all artefacts in a win-
dow of 30 s, 60 s, or 60 min.
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• Variable length continuous activity sessions. If two
artefacts are closer together in time than a prede-
fined temporal threshold, they are considered to be
in the same session. Otherwise, the second artefact
is considered the start of the next session.
We would expect to see that the variable length ap-
proach produces a smaller number of sessions compared to
the fixed-length approach (and this expectation was borne
out during our experiments, figures 4 and 5), especially for
sessions containing long periods of activity. The variable-
length approach organically follows the activity from be-
ginning to end of the session without artificially breaking
up long sessions into smaller chunks. However, like-for-like
comparison between sessions is open to some interpreta-
tion when using a variable length approach. Two sessions
which could have the exact same component members and
look at face value to be the same, could have very differ-
ent characteristics. For example one session being two or
three times longer than the other and having quite differ-
ent behaviour at the beginning and end of the session.
The problem with using sessions is capturing the right
amount of information that represents the ‘behaviour’ that
is taking place at the time. The simplest example of this
is where two users share the same user account on a com-
puter, but each uses the computer for accessing very dif-
ferent website interests. Choosing a very large fixed-length
size could easily capture the usage of the computer by both
users, when there is very likely a desire to try and isolate
the different access habits.
3.2. Components
Components are the events that are recorded within
the sessions. Within an Internet history analysis the visit
to a website domain ‘Google’ could be a component, or a
specific sub-division may be desirable for the components
such as ‘google.co.uk’ rather than ‘google.com’. A file sys-
tem analysis could make each directory a component, or
each file creation, modification or access to a file type could
be a component. In a wider pattern of life analysis of a
home automation system the activation of lights, devices
or other sensors could be recorded as components. Here,
we focus on conventional Internet history components.
Components are established at analysis time and al-
though the number of times a component is used may be
recorded, for example multiple visits to the same website
during the same session, this information is less significant
in session-to-session analysis as it would be in a sequen-
tial analysis where the recurrence of the event ‘A’ in the
sequence ABCAEFAG has significance. The binary con-
dition of an event if it was or was not present during the
session is sufficient for session-to-session. For example, if
trying to attribute a particular session to a specific user
who is known to be a motorcycle enthusiast, the number of
times that a motorcycle-related website is accessed is sub-
stantially less significant than the fact that the motorcycle
website was accessed at all.
Figure 1: A simple session component table with five sessions, five
components and two different user behaviours (Left) and the corre-
sponding session-to-session pairwise comparison (Right)
3.3. Plotting the Number of Sessions
We highlight two approaches to producing temporally
aggregated sessions, a fixed-length session comprising of all
the components within a fixed time window and a variable-
length session containing all the components until a time
gap between components is exceeded. The number of ses-
sions produced by performing these aggregations can be
plotted against the time in seconds for the fixed-length or
variable-length threshold. Our assertion is that small val-
ues of time for the fixed-length sessions or variable-length
thresholds will identify ‘systemic’ behaviour as the result-
ing sessions will be smaller slices of the timeline and fre-
quently occurring events will be emphasised. Larger values
of time however will allow a more comprehensive pattern
of life as the user’s repetitive behaviour will develop over
the period of time and can be recognised if it recurs.
3.4. Jaccard Similarity Coefficient
By creating a binary condition for components a simple
visual display can be made for the components per session
as can be seen in Figure 1, which shows an example set
of data containing five components (C1 to C5) and five
sessions. Session 1 to 3 represent user 1, whereas sessions
4 and 5 represent user 2. Even with this example small
set of data the repetitive pattern in sessions 4 and 5 and
somewhat in sessions 1 and 3 stand out well visually.
The sessions, however, form a simple string which can
have a pairwise distance comparison. For example session
1 [10101] and session 2 [00111] can be calculated to have a
distance of 0.5 using the Jaccard similarity coefficient [13]
(which is to say they share 2 of the 4 components). The
following equation is for calculating the Jaccard Distance
between two sets of data:
dj(A,B) = 1− J(A,B) =
|A ∪B| − |A ∩B|
|A ∪B|
(1)
The advantage of using Jaccard is that it only considers
the components in sessions 1 and 2 that they share and
does not consider C2, which is 0 in both cases. When
dealing with some 4000 components all of them 0’s such
as seen in typical frequently used home computer Internet
history, then using a pairwise comparison method such
as the Hamming Distance [10], which produces a 0.999
similarity due to all the shared 0 components is undesirable
and the Jaccard distance measure is substantially more
useful.
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Figure 2: Sample of Components taken from the S-dataset showing
50 sessions and two users
In figure 2 we see a sample of real data displayed as a
component table. The first half of the figure shows User
1 and the second half of the figure, in grey, is User 2. We
can see that some components are clearly present in both
users’ history but the overall appearance is that these are
two quite different sets of activity and that within each
user there are clearly patterns of components that appear
to be repeating.
3.5. Session-to-Session Patterns
Using the Jaccard similarity coefficient it can be seen in
figure 1 that Session 1 and Session 4 share no components
in common and consequently their similarity is 0.0. Indeed
all sessions can be compared pairwise against all of the
other sessions, as seen in Figure 1 (right).
Patterns are constructed by identifying groups of two
or more sessions that are above a Jaccard distance mea-
sure. Although any value above 0.0 is potentially useful,
the number of loosely associated sessions significantly in-
creases as the acceptable Jaccard value is lowered. For
example, at a level of 1.0, one session pattern is created:
Pattern 1 = [s4 s5]. At a Jaccard level of 0.5, two session
patterns are created: Pattern 1 = [s1 s2 s3], Pattern 2 =
[s4 s5].
The objective of our session-to-session comparison is to
identify a pair or more of sessions that belong to the same
repetitive behaviour, and the inference is that this could
be the same user. If the level of association is lowered
sufficiently then any vaguely similar activity, potentially
belonging to different users will be identified in our session-
to-session pattern, and if too high a level only an exact
match will be valid.
3.6. Conclusion of the Approach
We have shown in this section of the paper that there
are two approaches to performing session selection and we
have also discussed how to convert Internet history into
components. We note that the number and frequency of
components per session is not as significant within session-
to-session analysis and this has allowed us to translate the
presence or absence of a component within a session into
a simple binary string.
The table of components shown in figure 2 derived us-
ing the principal component analysis of [7] is interesting
in that it shows to an experienced analyst the presence of
different types of repeating activity. However, such tables
quickly become unwieldy. As such, a systematic, prefer-
ably quantitative comparison of these sessions is required.
Also, it is important to consider an appropriate string com-
parison method. For this, we have selected the Jaccard
coefficient, which deals solely with the comparison of the
components that are present within the sessions, rather
than a method which considers all possible components
within the Internet history.
4. Experiments
We present in this section two practical examples of
our approach, and experimental tests to determine the
effectiveness of two particular problems, namely the ses-
sion selection using both fixed-length and variable-length
methods and the session-to-session evaluation of the com-
ponents at different tolerance levels for the Jaccard coeffi-
cient.
The aim of these experiments is to show that for test
data where there is a known ground truth of which arte-
facts belong to which users, we can perform multiple vari-
ations of the experiments to identify the settings for the
variables such that in the future an analyst with an un-
known dataset can be confident, to a certain level of error,
to have achieved the optimal session-level analysis.
4.1. Experimental Data
The data used in the experiments are Internet history
timelines. The artefacts are a temporally ordered sequence
of URLs. The component selection is therefore at the do-
main level part of the URL, rather than individual web
page artefacts.
In both of the two datasets the scenario is that there is
a single device and a single user account that multiple users
have access to. In the one dataset, there are three possible
users, and in the other dataset there are two possible users.
This type of scenario, where the is a single machine with all
the users having access to a single account is both realistic
and not uncommon in law enforcement investigations in a
domestic setting or commercial investigation setting where
there is stand-alone machine with no, or poorly enforced
access control.
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Figure 3: Sample of processed Internet history from the S-dataset
S-Dataset
This is a single dataset constructed from three different
workstations used in the M57-patents scenario of the Dig-
ital Corpora Project [25]. The resulting data is an office-
based PC that has a sparsely populated Internet history
for three different ‘users’ all with access to a single user
account, but with a significant time gap between the users
to ensure that no large variable-length threshold or fixed-
length session could cause different user data to appear in
the same session. This data simulates the use of a shared
computer by three different staff members all working on
different shift patterns, where there is no chance of over-
lap. A sample of the processed history data can be seen
at figure 3. Each of the three users has approximately a
similar size of Internet history in both time period and
number of artefacts.
R-Dataset
The R-dataset is from a modern home PC with a single
user account involved in a real law enforcement scenario,
where the identity of the user at a particular time could
be one of a possible two users sharing the same PC. The
Internet history is extensive and lengthy periods of contin-
uous usage are present. User 1 is the majority user of the
PC whereas User 2 is a minority user with a considerably
smaller number of accesses on the PC.
4.2. Plotting the Sessions
We have plotted in figures 4 and 5 the number of ses-
sions that are available for analysis when the Internet his-
tory is aggregated using the two approaches and using the
Figure 4: Graph showing for the S-dataset the number of sessions to
analyse plotted against the size (in seconds) for the variable-length
threshold or the fixed-length session size.
time groups of 30, 60, 120, 300, 600, 900, 1200, 1800 and
3600 s (half a minute, 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, 30 and 60 min re-
spectively).
In figures 4 and 5 we see that a substantial reduction
in the number of sessions occurs when a threshold value or
fixed-size of 10 to 15 min is chosen. For Internet history
analysis this seems reasonable given that a person can still
be active on a computer reading pages or watching videos
whilst there is an infrequent recording of artefacts onto the
computer. If the timeline was of a different kind of arte-
fact, for example file system artefacts, then a very different
type of behaviour would be observed. Future work com-
bining multiple different levels of artefacts could require
their own session-to-session artefacts to accommodate that
difference.
The number of sessions is always a greater number
when using fixed-length session sizes rather than variable-
length sessions. The variable-length data tends to fall off
quickly, flatten and the number of sessions changes little
regardless if a session length of 900 seconds or 3500 sec-
onds is used. Similarly the fixed-length session ultimately
flattens to a number of sessions that changes little after a
session length of 1800 seconds is selected.
4.3. Data Reduction
The data was reduced by removing single occurrence
components. Although the single occurrences may have
investigative value as important one-time events, for the
analysis of repetitive behaviour the single occurrences serve
to only reduce the Jaccard distance between two sessions.
4.4. Correct Classification of User Activity
Our hypothesis for the experiments is that if two ses-
sions have a high Jaccard Coefficient then they belong to
the same user. To test this assertion we have used two
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Figure 5: Graph showing for the R-dataset the number of sessions to
analyse plotted against the size (in seconds) for the variable-length
threshold or the fixed-length session size.
Internet history timelines as our sample test data. The
histories have different characteristics and we do not pro-
pose that they represent ‘model behaviour’, indeed we note
substantial further work is required to model what is ‘nor-
mal user behaviour’ in a number of settings such as an
office environment, shared domestic environment etc.
Although we have referred to the results of the experi-
ments as the correct user identification, the experiment is
not identifying that session X belongs to User 1 and ses-
sion Y belongs to User 2. What we are instead identifying
is that if the two session patterns are above the Jaccard
coefficient threshold in the experiment (0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and
1.0) and they belong to different users then that is a fail-
ure, whereas if the sessions belong to only one user then
that is considered a correct identification of the user’s self-
similar behaviour. For example, the sample data in figure
1 (right), when comparing session 2 and session 4 we can
see that there is a 0.25 similarity between the two sets of
data. If these sessions represented different users then we
would correctly identify them as separate users when using
a threshold of 1.0, 0.75 and 0.5, but we would see them
incorrectly identified as belonging to the same user when
the threshold was lowered to 0.25.
Figures 6 and 8 show the variable-length threshold ap-
proach plotted against the S-dataset and R-dataset respec-
tively and figures 7 and 9 show the fixed-length time values
for the same datasets.
5. Evaluation
5.1. Overall Performance of the Approach
The greatest overhead in the approach is computing
the Jaccard distance coefficients for pairwise sessions. The
number of sessions to compute is larger when using the
Figure 6: S-Dataset using the Variable Length approach
Figure 7: S-Dataset using the Fixed-Length approach
Figure 8: R-Dataset using the Variable-Length approach
fixed-length approach to session aggregation and when us-
ing short thresholds or fixed-lengths this can lead to signif-
icant computation time. Attempting to reduce the com-
putational overhead by performing some kind of clustering
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Figure 9: R-Dataset using the Fixed-Length approach
of components such as those suggested in Gresty et al. [7]
is not particularly effective as the number of sessions is the
main overhead. However, we note that such a reduction
would potentially provide a more “juror friendly” visual
representation of the Internet history than a full version,
such as seen in the sample shown in figure 2.
The S-dataset was deliberately set up such that there
was no chance of multiple different users being classified
within the same session. The R-dataset did have a single
example where the two users were accessing the original
computer in close temporal proximity, and as such a erro-
neous classification did occur when the threshold was less
than 600 seconds.
5.2. Fixed-length compared against Variable-length
The overall impression with respect to Internet history
is that the variable-length approach performs substantially
better than the fixed-length approach, which is somewhat
expected as the variable-length approach better models the
human-driven usage of the devices. We have not in this
paper tested shorter, bursty artefacts that are indicative
of systemic processes.
5.3. Jaccard Coefficient Levels
Within the graphs we see that with the variable-length
approach and a Jaccard Measure of 0.75, we see optimal
performance between 300 and 900 s. The association be-
tween sessions is not too restrictive (as at 1.0), yet the
performance of correctly classifying users is much higher
than at 0.5 and below.
5.4. Correct User Detection Rate
In the variable-length graphs for the S-dataset in figure
6, we see an 80-90% accurate classification rate in the 0.75
to 1.0 levels, and for the R-dataset in figure 8 a steadily
increasing accurate classification rate from 56-80%. For an
untrained, non-optimised approach that does not use any
kind of profiling or classification of the sessions prior to
analysis, we find these classification results very encourag-
ing.
Within the long session-to-session patterns there were
often a small number of “spoiler” sessions that contained
frequently occurring components. The smaller size session-
to-session patterns were the least likely to incorrectly clas-
sify the user, because as the Jaccard measure is raised
closer to 1.0 the less sessions appear in the pattern and con-
sequently fewer “spoiler” sessions appear in the pattern.
The “spoilers” contain components that are not unique to
an individual user within the dataset, but rather are com-
monly occurring activity one would expect to find within
Internet history across a variety of users: within these pat-
terns we find access to Google or MSN.
We have also experimented with removing the frequently
occurring components. This dramatically increased the
success rate, to 100% in some cases, but with the trade-
off that the number of sessions were reduced and in some
cases, such as with the R-dataset where User 2, who was
the minority user, was completely removed from the dataset
by performing this reduction. In this case User 2 had char-
acteristically an extremely repetitive behaviour and by re-
moving the frequently occurring components the type of
individual that we are hoping to detect was eliminated
from detection.
It seems likely that a combination approach to dealing
with the “spoiler” components where some form of prior
knowledge or training outside of the analysis could be used
to identify and eliminate generic components, coupled with
eliminating the top X percentage of components. Further
research will focus on the quantity of reduction and/or
prior knowledge that is required to successful increase cor-
rect identification of users’ self-similar behaviour.
6. Conclusion and further work
We have presented an approach for temporally aggre-
gating Internet history artefacts into sessions and we have
argued that there is an investigative use for performing
session-to-session comparisons, such that one-time events
and repetitive behaviour within the Internet history can
be identified. The approach and experiments presented
within this paper shown an approach that is untrained,
does not require any prior knowledge, and can be used by
an investigator to identify and demonstrate habitual be-
haviour. Ultimately the goal of our research project is to
produce and make available, a tool that can be used to
test investigative hypotheses, such as “At time and date
X, was there repetitive behaviour?”, “Are there any repeti-
tive patterns that contain notable one-time events that are
of interest to an investigator?” etc. Coupling such a tool
with a systematic approach to testing testimony and fac-
tual evidence such as seen in [14], we believe would greatly
assist an analyst or investigator and could be the difference
between the investigator merely suggesting that something
appears to be a common activity, as opposed to being able
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to demonstrate that something is indeed a pattern of life
supported by evidence.
By reducing the Internet history to components we
have shown that the history can be displayed, such as
in figure 2, and even a human looking at the data can
visualise the differences and similarities between sessions.
However, with thousands of components and potentially
tens of thousands of sessions it becomes impractical how-
ever to visually parse an entire Internet history. We there-
fore show that the components can be converted to a bi-
nary sting, which we are able to numerically test in terms
of similarity between two sessions. Our experimental re-
sults have highlighted that different methods of session se-
lection can produce considerably different types and sizes
of sessions. For the analysis of Internet history we see that
with the datasets used within this paper it is reasonable to
use threshold interval to separate the sessions with values
between 10 and 15 min and that variable-length sessions
show the greatest accuracy at classifying individual user
behaviour when there are multiple users of the same com-
puter.
The experiments presented in this paper produced a
90% successful classification for one specific dataset and
session aggregation method. However, we are of the opin-
ion that classifying generic and commonly accessed web-
sites would allow greater reduction of error patterns and
greater identification of unique session patterns. Our ini-
tial experiments removing a percentage of the mostly fre-
quently occurring components did yield very high correct
classification rate at the cost of losing some important
repetitive behaviour. Therefore, further work is required
for the selection of the correct percentage of commonly
occurring “spoiler” components to remove, possibly with
the inclusion of prior or trained knowledge about what
components are generic.
6.1. Future Work
The techniques proposed here are purely session aggre-
gate, based upon a static value chosen at the beginning of
the analysis. The result can produce extremely large data
sets which are time consuming to process in pairwise or-
der. We believe that the sessions can be reduced by session
profiles, where sessions with similar characteristics such as
length, duration, time of day and density of artefacts per
time period, are processed together.
In the analysis of our experimental results, we noted
that there is potentially a bias when using the Jaccard
coefficient towards patterns being made up from sessions
with few numbers of components, or with larger numbers
of components that have a high degree of dependency. It
is a bias in part by design, but as is highlighted above,
selecting higher levels of Jaccard measures can be used
to reduce the number of sessions in the session patterns.
There could however be a level of dynamic selection such
as if a session has few components then there may be a
demand for it having a higher Jaccard value before it is
added to the patterns. If the session has a large number
or variety of components then a lower level of tolerance
may be useful. The value on a pattern may be controlled
by the complexity of the pattern. A suitable measure of
complexity is a matter of further work.
A possible expansion of this work is the automatic clas-
sification of actual web-based behaviour, where the ses-
sions are grouped and classified as noted within the paper
but also a lookup is performed against the cached or re-
covered Internet history pages present on the device. This
enhancement would require the ability to parse the pages
and determine the content based upon the words that are
present there. The cached web pages are quite often not
available to an investigator. In such cases, a lookup may be
performed against a resource such as the Internet Archive
Wayback Machine [27] which can be searched for the clos-
est time period that corresponds to the recovered Internet
history artefacts on the device under investigation. This
enhancement would allow an investigators to quickly iden-
tify the one-time events and repetitive events without at-
tempting to interpret the URLs in the Internet history
themselves.
The session-to-session approach provides a broad overview
of a whole session, but does not adequately consider whether
sub-session behaviours combine together to form the ses-
sions. For this, we are developing component-to-component
analysis to complement the session-to-session analysis.
The approach presented in this paper is a session-to-
session comparison with no consideration to the order, se-
quence, volume and frequency of the components within
the sessions. The next step of profiling two ostensibly sim-
ilar sessions is to mine the sequential patterns within the
session to identify useful repeating pattern sequences of
the components. We are of the opinion that by identifying
the sessions which are likely candidates to be similar using
a session-to-session approach, the computation overhead
examining intra-session will be substantially reduced.
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